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IS	A	SECOND	MOMMY	A	GOOD	ENOUGH	SECOND	
PARENT?:	WHY	VOLUNTARY	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	
OF	PATERNITY	SHOULD	BE	AVAILABLE	
TO	LESBIAN	CO-PARENTS
By Julia Saladino1
I.	 Introduction
Janet Jenkins simply wants to see her 
daughter. Jenkins and her former partner, Lisa 
Miller, jointly agreed to parent a child together after 
obtaining a civil union in Vermont.2 Miller completed 
artifi cial insemination with the consent and support 
of  Jenkins. After Miller gave birth in Virginia to 
the couple’s daughter, Isabella, the two women 
cohabitated and co-parented in Virginia before 
separating.3 Because Miller is the biological mother 
of  Isabella, she fervently tried to deny parental rights 
to Jenkins after their separation. The case gained 
considerable attention, and Miller fi led custody 
disputes in both Virginia and Vermont. Ultimately, 
Virginia’s Supreme Court held that the Vermont 
courts have jurisdiction, and Vermont’s Supreme 
Court determined that Jenkins did in fact have 
parental rights.4 Virginia, therefore, could not modify 
the custody order. Even today, Miller continues to 
appeal the case and objects to sharing physical custody 
with Jenkins.5 Jenkins’ case is not particularly unique. 
Same-sex parents all over the country face custody 
disputes after separating.6 Often the biological parent 
claims full parental authority, and if  the parents live in 
a state where same-sex marriages or civil unions are 
not recognized, the non-biological parent may be left 
with limited resources.7
These custody cases raise the family law issue 
of  what constitutes a parent. If  both parties agree 
to co-parent, what makes one parent more entitled 
to parenting rights than the other? Does biology 
dictate parenting rights when the couple has a pre-
established agreement to co-parent? In states where 
second parent adoption is incredibly diffi cult or not 
available, non-biological parents have limited options 
to gain legal parentage over their children.8 This 
paper argues that alternative avenues for parental 
rights, specifi cally Voluntary Acknowledgements of  
Paternity (VAP) which allow the parties to establish 
parentage by signing an affi davit shortly after the 
child’s birth, should be available to lesbian co-parents. 
I further argue that VAPs are appropriate devices to 
establish consensual parentage rights at a child’s birth 
and that making these forms available to lesbian co-
parents satisfi es the equal protection clause of  the 
Constitution and meets Congress’ original policy 
considerations in developing the federal VAP statute.
II.	 Background
The VAP process is a simplifi ed 
administrative procedure that allows the government 
to easily identify parents in the absence of  a marital 
presumption of  parentage.9 One of  Congress’ 
original policy concerns for adopting VAP statutes 
in the 1990s was to facilitate the collection of  child 
support funds.10 In order to put a simplifi ed procedure 
in place, Congress created a federal child support 
enforcement statute, Title IV-D.11 To receive federal 
funding, Congress requires each state to establish 
informal procedures for establishing paternity.12
Consequently, each state has a VAP statute in place 
to easily facilitate this process without requiring the 
involvement of  the judicial system every time an 
unwed mother gives birth.13
An additional Congressional consideration 
when promoting the VAP process is to encourage 
the establishment of  legal parentage as early in a 
child’s life as possible. Because our legal system 
recognizes two parents for children, the VAP process 
is attractive and allows this determination to be 
made with judicial ease.14 The legal determination 
of  parentage additionally follows the child and her 
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parents throughout the country. Because a VAP is 
treated as a court order, states view a VAP granted 
in another state with full faith and credit, eliminating 
the need to litigate parentage when a parent moves 
across state lines.15 Not all findings of  parentage are 
afforded full faith and credit however.16 States are 
allowed to refuse to grant full faith and credit to other 
state’s statutes, so accordingly, a finding of  parentage 
based on a statute will not clearly always be afforded 
full faith and credit outside that state.17
Court orders, unlike findings of  parentage 
based on a statute, have portability and are generally 
granted full faith and credit.18 Since VAPs are treated 
as judicial determinations, states should grant these 
parentage determinations full faith and credit. This 
full faith and credit aspect of  the VAP process affords 
greater administrative ease to the judicial system 
and protects individual parental rights.19 Because 
lesbian co-parents who cannot access second parent 
adoptions need some form of  legal protection that 
transfers across state lines, access to the VAP process 
could have significant and critical implications for 
lesbian co-parents’ parental rights.
The VAP procedure consists of  a hospital-
based program where an unmarried couple has 
the option of  signing an affidavit voluntarily 
acknowledging paternity immediately before or after 
the child’s birth. Some state VAP forms require that 
the affidavits state that the parents have some reason 
to believe that the male is the biological father.20 
Additionally, VAPs serve as a judicial determination 
of  parentage and are very difficult to challenge later 
in the child’s life. Typically, once both parents sign 
a VAP, a court will overturn the determination of  
parentage only if  the male parent signed due to a 
mother’s representation that amounts to fraud.21
In Andrew R. v. Arizona Dept. of  Economic 
Security, Andrew and Mother signed a VAP after 
the birth of  Isabella.22 Another man claiming 
paternity over Isabella challenged the voluntary 
acknowledgement of  paternity. The court 
determined that because Andrew R. and Isabella’s 
mother signed the VAP, a judicial determination of  
parentage stands despite evidence that another man 
is Isabella’s actual biological father, and Andrew was 
financially responsible for Isabella. The court noted 
that after properly executed, a VAP in Arizona stands 
unless challenged within 60 days on the basis of  
fraud or duress. This case demonstrates the relative 
difficulty of  dismissing a validly executed VAP after a 
reasonable time period.
Although the state is often eager to find a 
second parent to support a child to avoid financial 
burden on the government, Andrew R. articulates 
the burden an individual faces when challenging an 
acknowledgement of  paternity.23 Often, unless the 
challenging party can prove fraud, duress, or material 
mistake of  fact, the finding of  parentage established 
through a VAP stands.24 Additionally, in cases where 
the child’s education and or custody is at issue, 
rather than challenging child support orders, courts 
will honor VAPs, even in the absence of  a father’s 
biological tie to the child.25 These cases demonstrate 
that VAPs are difficult to overturn, and that a party 
challenging parentage based on a VAP faces a high 
burden.26 Cases where judges have overturned 
parentage determinations often contain some finding 
of  duress or fraud.27
Historically, the VAP process has been closed 
off  to lesbian co-parents. In states that model their 
VAP statute on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) 
and require the non-biological parent to attest to a 
belief  of  biological parenthood, lesbian co-parents 
are unable to meet this requirement.28 The UPA is 
not a desirable model for state VAP statutes because 
its gender specific language forecloses the VAP 
procedure for lesbian couples.29 Federal legislation 
does not have this requirement, and the male parent 
signing the VAP is not compelled to attest to being 
the biological father.30 If  a state limits access to VAPs 
to situations where both parents have a reason to 
believe the father signing the affidavit is the biological 
father, they are not made available to a lesbian partner. 
Lesbian partners cannot claim biological parentage 
when her partner is the biological parent.31 However, 
case law demonstrates that even when parents sign 
a VAP with knowledge that the listed father is not 
the child’s biological father, the VAP will be still be 
honored.32 The father’s false affidavit typically does 
not constitute fraud or coercion because even though 
the man knows he is not the biological father, he still 
signs the VAP to demonstrate his agreement to co-
parent.33
Accordingly, state legislatures should not 
follow the UPA model and should instead allow two 
adults to consent to parentage immediately before 
or after the child’s birth, regardless of  biological 
parenthood. Additionally, I argue that when two 
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lesbians make the decision to co-parent, the non-
biological parent should have the same ability to 
establish parentage as a similarly situated male so as 
not to violate equal protection. Finally, access to VAPs 
for both heterosexual and lesbian parents furthers 
Congress’ policy considerations of  establishing 
parentage early in a child’s life and ensuring that 
children have two parents responsible for their needs, 
and therefore lesbian co-parents should have an 
option to sign a VAP.34
III.	Analysis
A. Voluntary Acknowledgements of  Paternity are 
appropriate for use within lesbian parenting units 
because courts do not always rely on biology to 
determine  parentage.
VAPs are an appropriate method of  
establishing parentage of  a lesbian partner because 
courts uphold VAPs even in instances where the 
father signs the affidavit with knowledge that he is 
not the biological father.35 Under the federal statute 
governing VAPs, a man may voluntarily acknowledge 
his paternity as long as the mother consents.36 
Federal law does not require genetic testing before 
a man has access to the VAP process, indicating that 
the “acknowledged father” may not always be the 
biological father.37 Similarly, if  a non-biological lesbian 
partner wishes to acknowledge parentage and the 
biological mother consents, federal and state statutes 
should allow the couple to utilize the VAP procedure 
to legally establish parentage. In some states, under 
the current VAP process, a man acknowledging 
paternity must attest that he believes himself  to be 
the biological father.38 However, in practice, a man 
can use the system to establish parentage even with 
the knowledge that he is not the biological father.39 
Because VAPs are extremely difficult to overturn, 
a heterosexual couple can essentially consent to 
parentage and bypass the judicial process, while 
lesbian couples are not allowed the same convenience.
One argument against allowing homosexual 
couples access to the VAP process is that these 
couples may circumvent adoption by doing so. A 
lesbian co-parent that signs a VAP, however, is not 
circumventing second-parent adoption any more so 
than a heterosexual male co-parent accessing the VAP 
process. Both the female and the male co-parent are 
establishing parentage without first proving a genetic 
tie to the child or completing the adoption procedure. 
Adoptions are intended to terminate one party’s legal 
parental rights and grant those rights to another party 
or in the case of  second-parent adoption, establish 
a second parent’s parental rights.40 In an Ohio case, 
the court determined that a gestational surrogacy 
agreement rebutted a presumption of  parentage 
when the birth mother did not want to abide by the 
surrogacy contract.41 This situation is a more accurate 
example of  circumventing adoption.
In this case, the appellee, an unmarried 
woman, contacted an Ohio clinic to find anonymous 
sperm and egg donors and a surrogate in order to 
fulfill a gestational surrogate pregnancy.  The clinic 
located the appellant surrogate and the two women 
along with the appellee’s fiancé entered into a 
surrogacy agreement naming the appellee as the 
intended mother and the appellant as the surrogate. 
According to the contract all parental rights and 
responsibilities belonged to the appellee, and the 
appellant agreed to relinquish all rights.  When the 
appellant challenged the surrogacy agreement and 
tried to establish herself  as the child’s legal mother, 
the appellate court determined that the surrogacy 
agreement trumped the birth mother’s rights.42 The 
judge relied on Ohio’s Parentage Act and reasoned that 
“appellee’s voluntary acknowledgment of  maternity 
is sufficient to rebut the presumption that appellant 
is the child’s natural mother by reason of  her having 
given birth to the child.”43 This Ohio case, however, 
is not representative of  how the VAP process should 
operate for lesbian couples, where in most cases the 
lesbian co-parent would be establishing parentage of  
her partner’s biological or birth child. Additionally, 
because many states do not grant second parent 
adoptions for same-sex co-parents, lesbian couples 
may be in even more dire need for the VAP process 
than heterosexual couples.44
In Chicago, Illinois a judge upheld a 
VAP despite contradictory biological evidence. A 
heterosexual couple that had dated in the past but 
never married agreed to sign a VAP when Torres gave 
birth in 2001.45 Torres tried to extinguish Huddleston’s 
paternity despite the fact that Huddleston had acted 
as a parent for two years, playing with the child, 
changing diapers, and contributing to the child’s 
financial needs. The Domestic Relations Judge 
determined that the parties exhibited a clear and 
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unambiguous intent to name Huddleston as father 
of  the child. Because both parties contributed to 
the misrepresentation, the fact that the affidavit 
was improperly signed was immaterial to the case. 
Huddleston, though not the biological father, was 
determined to have legal rights to the child.46 The 
judge strongly considered Huddleston’s active role in 
the child’s life for the preceding two years. The judge 
reasoned that “both parties are participants in what 
the court views as their clear, unambiguous intent 
to denominate Mr. Huddleston as the parent of  this 
child,” and therefore the VAP must remain valid.47
A lesbian non-biological parent who intends 
to act as a child’s parent should have the option of  
legally establishing paternity through the use of  a 
VAP. If  biology is not the determinative factor for 
heterosexual couples that utilize the VAP process, 
then biology alone should not bar a same-sex, non-
biological parent from accessing the VAP procedure.48 
Even though the VAP system in some states is 
premised on biological considerations, in practice, 
a finding contrary to an attestation of  biological 
parenthood often does not void a VAP. As a result, 
lesbian non-biological parents should have the same 
access as heterosexual male parents.
The Supreme Court has also suggested that 
biology is not the determinative factor in establishing 
parentage. The Court held that the law does not 
recognize the rights of  biological parents claiming a 
relationship to a child when a marital parental unit 
exists. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Michael sought 
recognition as a dual father for a child born to a 
woman with whom he was previously engaged in an 
affair.49 Because the mother was married to Gerald at 
the time of  the child’s birth, Gerald had parental rights 
because of  California’s marital presumption.50 Even 
though Michael maintained a parental relationship 
with the child, Justice Scalia held that Michael’s 
relationship with his daughter is not “an interest 
traditionally protected by our society.”51 Michael, 
therefore, was legally barred from being the child’s 
father. While this case stands for the proposition of  
privileging parental rights in marital relationships, 
Michael H. also demonstrates that biology alone is 
not the determinative factor granting custody. The 
holding in Michael H. opposes a functional parenting 
framework but still supports the proposition that 
biology is not the ultimate threshold for parental 
rights.52 Accordingly, the law should allow lesbian, 
non-biological parents parental rights even despite 
the absence of  a biological connection to the child.
Because biology is not determinative of  the 
validity of  a VAP, states should eliminate the affidavit 
of  “believed biology” in their VAP statutes and 
forms and instead adopt an affidavit that establishes 
the signing parent expects and consents to act as 
a parent to the child assuming all the rights and 
responsibilities that accompany parentage. Parentage 
should reflect a functional parenting framework 
rather than a biological parenthood requirement. 
Functional parenthood applies when a person acts as 
a parent without being a child’s biological parent. A 
person who has a relationship with the child, cares 
for the child, and supports the child while not having 
a biological relationship to the child is an example of  
a functional parent.53
As familial make-ups in society continue to 
change and expand, legislatures and judges are more 
willing to define, create, and interpret family law in 
ways that do not only consider biology.54 Courts 
that are willing to liberally interpret the definition of  
parenthood and family have increasingly looked to 
what is in the child’s best interests when paternity is 
challenged.55 For example, a father who has acted as a 
child’s parent and then finds genetic proof  that he is 
not the father may still have parental responsibilities 
to that child.56 If  a court finds that the father has 
sufficiently acted as a parent and established a 
continued relationship with the child, then the court 
may determine that maintaining that parent-child 
relationship is in the best interests of  the child. 
Instead of  relying primarily on biology, judges should 
be more willing to consider the functional parenting 
of  the parent and make a determination that prefers 
relationships to genetics.
B. Denying Voluntary Acknowledgements of  
Paternity to a non-biological parent in a lesbian 
couple unconstitutionally discriminates on the 
basis of  gender and therefore violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of  the Fourteenth Amendment.
Denying a non-biological lesbian partner the 
option of  signing a VAP violates equal protection 
because similarly situated male, heterosexual parents 
are allowed to sign a VAP and the discrimination is 
not substantially related to the important government 
interest. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution provides that “no state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of  the laws.”57 Because a male that is not a 
child’s biological father is able to sign a VAP without 
first genetically establishing paternity, a similarly 
situated female must have the same opportunity. 
Therefore, a non-biological lesbian parent who 
wants to establish paternity through a VAP must be 
afforded that option in order for a state’s VAP statute 
to satisfy equal protection.
Laws that differentiate based on the parent’s 
gender will not survive equal protection challenges 
unless the laws satisfy intermediate scrutiny.58 To 
stand, the law must serve an important government 
interest and the law must be substantially related to 
that interest.59 In cases where states create parenting 
statutes that differentiate based on gender, the 
Supreme Court may invalidate those statutes if  
they do not satisfy intermediate scrutiny. In Caban 
v. Mohammed, a New York law gave mothers the 
absolute right to consent to adoption.60 Caban, 
the father, and Mohammed, the mother, had two 
children together but never married. After the 
couple separated, Caban petitioned for adoption of  
the children, and Mohammed cross-petitioned. The 
court granted Mohammed custody based on the 
New York Domestic Relations statute that allows 
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block 
their child’s adoption by withholding her consent. The 
Supreme Court held that the sex-based distinction 
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in the 
New York statute violated the equal protection clause 
of  the Fourteenth Amendment because it bore no 
substantial relation to any important state interest.61
Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court struck down an Illinois statute that made 
children of  unwed parents wards of  the State upon 
their mothers’ death.62 Stanley, a biological and 
functional parent for his four children, challenged the 
law when the state placed his children in the care of  
court appointed guardians after their mother died. 
Stanley’s parental rights were effectively terminated, 
despite other statutory provisions that required a 
showing of  unfitness to terminate parental rights.63 
Because the court never proved that Stanley was an 
unfit parent, rather, it discriminated against him on 
the basis of  his status as an unwed-father, Stanley 
argued that the state statute violated the equal 
protection clause. The Court held that the Illinois 
law violated equal protection because removing a 
child from an unwed father after the mother’s death, 
when the father had an existing relationship with the 
children, did not further the state’s interest of  having 
children cared for by fit parents.64
Based on the holdings in Caban and Stanley, 
state legislatures should create VAP statutes that 
refuse to differentiate on the basis of  gender. VAP 
statutes that preference male parents over female 
parents violate equal protection if  they do not 
meet intermediate scrutiny because the gender 
distinction is not substantially related to an important 
government interest. If  the government’s interest is 
administrative ease and establishing parentage early 
in a child’s life when an unwed mother gives birth, a 
VAP statute that only allows male parents to establish 
parentage is not substantially related to that interest. 
Such a statute would likely meet rational basis review 
but is under-inclusive and fails to satisfy the higher 
level of  scrutiny required when analyzing laws that 
discriminate on the basis of  gender. However, when 
a lesbian mother is impregnated and gives birth by 
means of  artificial insemination, there is likely no 
male that will claim parentage at the child’s birth. 
There could, however, be a female co-parent who 
wants to establish parentage. As both a legal and 
policy matter, VAP statutes should not deny access to 
female co-parents.
In Nguyen v. INS, however, Nguyen challenged 
the constitutionality of  8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).65 This 
section of  the U.S. Code governs the acquisition 
of  U.S. citizenship of  a child born to unmarried 
parents when only one parent is a U.S. citizen. The 
statute has different requirements for granting a child 
citizenship depending on whether the citizen parent 
is the mother or the father; the law makes it much 
more difficult for a citizen father to confer his U.S. 
citizenship to his child. The Supreme Court held that 
the statute survived intermediate scrutiny because 
although it involved classifications based on gender 
– raising the burden of  the father above the burden 
of  the mother – the law also achieved important 
government objectives of  ensuring that the father 
is biologically related to the child and that the child 
and parent have everyday ties.66 There is no need for 
the statute to impose these additional requirements 
on the mother because she necessarily will be with 
the child at birth and is guaranteed an opportunity 
to establish a relationship with the child. Nguyen, 
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therefore, provides an example of  where the Court 
held that a gender-based parentage classification 
did not violate the equal protection clause of  the 
Constitution and that a priority for biological ties is 
an important state interest.67
Still, Nguyen does not unequivocally support 
gender-based classifications based on biology. In the 
VAP situation, both a father and a lesbian co-parent 
both have the potential to lack biological ties to 
the child. Signing a VAP affirms that the co-parent 
agrees to accept parental rights and responsibilities 
associated with the child, regardless of  biology. The 
need to establish and promote biological ties is not 
furthered by excluding a co-parent when a biological 
mother is unmarried and consents to sharing parental 
rights with another parent.
Although Nguyen does establish that a gender-
based classification in parentage determinations is 
acceptable to uphold certain governmental interests, 
the VAP process does not reflect one of  those 
instances where a distinction is justified. In support 
of  the gender-based distinction in the VAP process, 
the government might claim that it has an interest 
in providing a child with a father rather than simply a 
second parent.68 Government and society’s preference 
for a two parent, opposite gender household is often 
premised on the notion that this is a healthier, more 
stable environment where children will grow up to 
understand and conform to their established gender 
roles.69 Such a justification, however, is not a valid 
reason to place an unconstitutional gender-based 
distinction on parentage determinations.70 Most 
distinctions between a father and a second parent 
would be based on stereotypes and are, therefore, not 
legitimate government interests that will satisfy equal 
protection.71
In the context of  the VAP process, if  a non-
biological male can consent to parentage through 
the VAP process, then in order to satisfy equal 
protection, a non-biological female should have the 
same access to the VAP procedure. While Congress 
and state legislatures may have intended states only 
to use VAPs in cases where an unwed mother can 
identify a potential biological father, in reality the 
statutes are often not used in that way and the finding 
of  parentage is still upheld. In In the Matter of  J.B. 
and J.G., J.B. was listed on the child’s birth certificate 
and signed an affidavit of  paternity.72 After a 
disagreement regarding the child’s schooling, J.B. filed 
in family court to establish his parental rights, and J.G. 
responded by alleging that J.B. was not the biological 
father and therefore did not have any parental rights.73 
The court determined that despite genetic testing 
that confirmed that J.B. was not biologically related 
to the child, overturning a previously established 
determination of  parentage would be inconsistent 
with the legislature’s intent.74 The court reasoned that 
because biology is not the sole avenue to establish 
parentage, the legislature intended for an expansive 
definition of  parent.75 Because J.B. correctly followed 
procedure to establish himself  as a parent under the 
law, his lack of  a biological relationship to the child 
did not bar him from enjoying the same parental 
rights to care and make decisions for the child as the 
mother.76 Accordingly, state VAP statutes should not 
differentiate based on the co-parent’s gender and lack 
of  biological ties to the child and should allow lesbian 
parents to access the VAP process.
C.  Use of  Voluntary Acknowledgements of  Paternity 
within lesbian parenting couples furthers Congress’ 
original policy considerations in enacting the federal 
VAP statute.
Allowing same-sex couples access to VAPs 
furthers Congress’ original policy considerations to 
create judicial and administrative ease in determining 
a child’s parentage and allow for efficient collection 
of  child support funds.77 In a child support system 
based on legal paternity rather than biology, allowing 
a co-parent to establish parentage early in the child’s 
life identifies another adult who is responsible for 
financially supporting the child. To further this goal, 
federal law states that after the 60-day rescission 
period, the parties may only challenge a VAP on the 
basis of  fraud, duress, or material mistake.78 Once 
the parties have identified a second legal, financially 
responsible parent, Congress does not allow the 
parties to rescind the finding arbitrarily. By making 
the process of  invalidating a VAP more difficult, 
the government can collect child support more 
efficiently because the parties have already consented 
to being financial responsible for the child. If  the 
couple separates before the child reaches the age of  
majority, or the couple chooses to never maintain a 
relationship, the parties will have already established 
paternity through the VAP process, and a judicial 
hearing to determine paternity will not be necessary 
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for the government to determine which individuals 
are responsible for paying child support.
In some jurisdictions, if  a custodial parent 
requires government assistance, the government 
will reimburse itself  by enforcing a child support 
order against the other biological parent (District 
of  Columbia operates this way). First, however, the 
government must find this individual, and spends 
public resources doing so. If  a second parent can 
establish paternity through the VAP process, the 
co-parent responsible for financially supporting the 
child has already been identified, and the government 
will not have to expend resources ascertaining the 
second responsible parent.79 Allowing all couples, 
regardless of  sexual orientation, to access the VAP 
process would relieve the government of  the burden 
of  soliciting personal information on a child’s other 
parent from a birth mother on public assistance.
Additionally, the court system would also 
be freed from the burden of  judicially establishing 
the paternity of  the other responsible parent. The 
VAP process, as it was intended, already allows 
heterosexual parents to consent to a judicial finding 
of  paternity. Allowing both heterosexual and lesbian 
couples access to this system permits the government 
to identify a co-parent in an additional situation 
where the parents are willing to consent to a judicial 
finding of  paternity, thereby furthering Congress’ 
goal of  creating administrative ease and efficient 
collection of  child support. 80 Parents and children 
would be best served and legally protected, and the 
government’s objectives of  administrative efficiency 
would be met, if  state legislatures allow same-sex 
parents to consent to parentage through a VAP just 
as heterosexual, unmarried parents are allowed.
IV.	Conclusion
Congress created the VAP system to allow 
unwed mothers the opportunity to establish the 
paternity of  a father at the child’s birth with relative 
simplicity. Such a system relieves both the judicial and 
administrative agencies of  the burden of  determining 
who are – or should be – a child’s parents. Although 
no states currently allow same-sex couples access to 
the VAP process, legislatures should open the VAP 
system to same-sex couples. In practice, biology is 
not the controlling factor for upholding paternity, and 
therefore, biology should not be the determinative 
criteria for allowing access to the VAP process. 
Additionally, allowing a similarly situated man access 
to the system but denying that same access to a woman 
violates equal protection; the government interests 
Congress identified are not substantially related to 
the gender discrimination in the VAP system. Finally, 
to satisfy Congress’ goals of  establishing parentage 
and allowing for ease in collecting child support, 
lesbian couples should have access to a system that 
easily creates a judicial determination of  parentage. 
If  two adults agree to co-parent and the mother is 
willing to consent to parentage, access to the VAP 
system creates ease for the government, the parents, 
and the child, and as a matter of  public policy, the 
system should be accessible to both heterosexual and 
lesbian couples.
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